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Notes
ACCIDENT INSURANCE - DISTINCTION BETWEEN
ACCIDENTAL RESULTS AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS
Insured died during surgery from shock produced by a very
rare blood transfusion reaction. Beneficiaries brought an action
for double indmenity benefits under a policy provision which
applied when death was caused by an injury effected through
external, violent, and accidental means. Defendant conceded that
the death of the insured was an accidental result but contended
that the means by which death occurred was intentional and
therefore could not be classified as an "accidental means." The
lower court dismissed the suit and on appeal to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, held, reversed. The technical distinction between
"accidental means" and "accidental result" is no longer recog-
nized in Louisiana. Death was produced by accidental means
within the meaning of the policy. Gaskins v. New York Life In-
8urance Company, 104 So.2d 171 (La. 1958).
Insurance coverage' for loss of life or bodily injury is fre-
quently restricted by policy provisions requiring that death or
injury be effected through "external, violent and accidental
means." Courts have treated this phrase as conjunctive and all
three qualifications must therefore be met before coverage is
afforded. 2 The meanings of the terms "external" and "violent"
are fairly well settled.3 There is disagreement, however, as to the
meaning and application of the term "accidental means." In a
number of jurisdictions, a distinction is drawn between insur-
ance provisions using the term "accidental means" and those
using terms such as "accident," "accidental," and "accidental in-
juries."4 In other jurisdictions, the distinction has been rejected
1. The broad term "insurance coverage" is used so as to incorporate various
types of insurance policies to which the phrase has been adapted, i.e., accident,
life, health, etc.
2. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (1888) ; 2 RICHARDS, INSUR-
ANCE § 217 (5th ed. 1952).
3. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 165 Ind. 317, 75 N.E. 262 (1905) ; Peele
v. Provident Fund Soc., 147 Ind. 543, 44 N.E. 661 (1896) ; Paul v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 112 N.Y. 472, 20 N.E. 347 (1889) ; VANcz, INsuRANCE § 181 (3d ed. 1951).
In general, the term "external" refers to the force or cause of the injury, and it is
necessary only that it be external to the person, though it acts internally. "Violent"
refers to the efficient cause which produces the harmful result, and may be ful-
filled by any force, however slight.
4. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934);
Thomason v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 248 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957)
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or repudiated and the terms are regarded as legally synonymous.5
There is no disagreement as to the meaning of "accident," "acci-
dental," and "accidental injuries." "Accident" and "accidental"
both mean that which happens by chance, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.6 The
words "accidental injuries" are construed to include injuries
caused by voluntary or intentional acts of the insured though
undesigned and unanticipated. 7 The jurisdictions which distin-
guish between the terms base their distinction on the idea that
the term "means" is synonymous with cause or the very act
which produces the harmful result.8 This distinction narrows the
scope of the term "accidental means" to include only those acts or
causes which produce the harmful result and which are in them-
selves accidental, undesigned, or unexpected. Thus, under this
(where the court stated that the cause itself must have been unexpected and acci-
dental and that it was insufficient that the injury be unusual and unexpected) ;
Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal.2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955) (the policy
herein provided for coverage against death or injury when due to "accidental
means" ; the court held that in order to recover, it was not sufficient that the
death or the injury be unexpected but that the very means must be proven unex-
pected) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gutowske, 49 Del. 233, 113 A.2d 579 (1955)
(court held that death by "accidental means" required the immediate and proxi-
mate cause of the death to be accidental) ; Johnson v. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818, 90 S.E.2d 36 (1955) (court held that the act which
precedes the injury must itself be accidental for the injury to result from acci-
dental means) ; Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Menard, 124 Ind. App. 606, 117 N.E.2d
376 (1954) (which held that the means must be accidental) ; Groves v. World Ins.
Co., 124 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. App. 1952) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Witt, 260 S.W.2d
641 (Ky. App. 1953) ; Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Partain, 205 Md. 60, 106
A.2d 79 (1954) ; Reeves v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 333 Mass. 314,
130 N.E.2d 541 (1955); Turner v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 316
Mich. 6, 24 N.W.2d 534 (1946) ; Daibey v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 105 Mt.
587, 74 P.2d 432 (1937) ; Shields v. Prudential Ins. Co., 6 N.J. 517, 79 A.2d 297
(1951) ; Buckles v. Continental Cas. Co., 197 Ore. 128, 251 P.2d 476 (1952)
McDonnell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 151 Pa. Super. 241, 30 A.2d 199 (1943);
Kimball v. Massachusetts Ace. Co., 44 R.I. 264, 117 Ati. 228 (1922) ; Interna-
tional Travelers Assoc. v. Marshall, 131 Tex. 258, 114 S.W.2d 851 (1938).
5. Wilson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Idaho 1949)
(where the court held that accidental means was synonymous with accidental re-
sults) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 204 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 480 (1942)
(wherein the court held that the contention that there is a technical distinction
between the terms "accidental means" and "accidental" was without merit);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d 80 (1937) ; Raley
v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 117 A.2d 110 (D.C. App. 1955) ; Comfort v.
Continental Casualty Co., 239 Iowa 1206, 34 N.W.2d 588 (1948) ; Tomlyanovich
v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953) ; Byrd v. Reserve Life
Ins. Co., 217 Miss. 761, 65 So.2d 249 (1953) ; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141
Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942) ; Sample v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 206,
87 S.E.2d 476 (1955) (instruction requested that where action is voluntary, any
resulting injury is not accidental, though unforeseen, was held properly overruled) ;
Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irwin, 178 Va. 265, 16 S.E.2d 646 (1941); Griswold
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935); O'Connell v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 61, 264 N.W. 253 (1936).
6. 2 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 215 (5th ed. 1952).
7. Ibid.
8. Annot., 166 A.L.R. 471 (1947).
NOTES
line of authority, death or injury is not incurred by "accidental
means" merely because the effect or the result is accidental.
This then precludes recovery under such a provision when the
intentional or voluntary acts of the insured cause undesigned or
unexpected death or injury.9 It should be noted that many courts,
although adhering to the view that coverage is not afforded
where only the result and not the means is accidental, have de-
veloped exceptions which allow recovery. The most common ex-
ception is to hold the distinction inapplicable when the act,
though voluntary or intentional, is accompanied by the occur-
rence of some mischance, slip, or mishap in doing the act itself.10
Those jurisdictions which reject or repudiate the distinction
reason that if there is an accidental result, there necessarily
must have been an accidental means - the two cannot logically
be separated, for either there is no accident at all or there is an
accident throughout." Thus, they conclude that the term "acci-
dental means" should not be construed in a technical sense, but
should be given its popular meaning according to common usage
and the understanding of the average man. In other words, the
guide of the courts should be the average expectation and pur-
poses of the average ordinary person when making an insurance
purchase.12
The Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to align itself with the
view that there was a distinction between the term "accidental
means" and the terms "accident," "accidental," and "accidental
injuries" in the early case of Brown v. Continental Casualty
Company." Under the facts of that case, a physician caused his
own death by inhalation of an excess amount of chloroform which
he used frequently for relief from headache pains. The decedent
intended to inhale the chloroform. Under a strict application of
the distinction, the means could be said to have been intentional
9. It should be noted that this is restricted to intentional acts of the insured,
for where the insured is injured by the intentional act of another and the injury
is not the result of misconduct or an aggression on the part of the injured, the
injury is accidental within the meaning of the usual accident policy provision. See
2 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 231 (5th ed. 1952).
10. Parker v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 178 La. 977, 152 So. 583
(1934) ; Brown v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 La. 229, 108 So. 464 (1926).
Note further that other propositions advanced by the courts are: (a) if the act is
due to proceedings on the part of the injured while in ignorance of a material fact
or condition which is unusual, Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 195
S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. 1946) ; and (b) where the injury is not the normal expected
result of the voluntary act, Brackman v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 5 So.2d
565 (La. App. 1942).
11. Annot., 166 A.L.R. 471, 474 (1947).
12. Id. at 475.
13. 161 La. 230, 108 So. 464 (1926).
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and thereby non-accidental. However, though evidencing out-
ward compliance with the distinction between accidental means
and accidental result, the court held that the excess amount in-
haled was unexpected and thus the death was classified as re-
sulting from "accidental means."'1 4 The case was later cited as
dealing with an unintentional act or cause of death.15 However,
the court of appeal for the first circuit construed the Brown case
as not acceding to the doctrine that to entitle the beneficiary to
recover, the means must be accidental, involuntary, and uninten-
tional.' 6 Confusion as to the validity of the distinction increased 7
with the Louisiana Supreme Court's next declaration on this
question. This was the case of Parker v. Provident Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co.' s The court there held that the weight of authority
was to the effect that injuries are not produced by "accidental
means" where the act or cause is intentional and voluntary. 19 In
that case, a workman suffered a hernia by pulling on a jack-
screw. The court held he was not entitled to disability benefits
predicated upon bodily injury sustained through "accidental
means" because he intended to pull on the jackscrew. 20  A the-
14. "We do not believe that the doctrine stated, making a distinction between
'accidental death or injury' and 'death or injury by accidental means' means that
.. the Insurance Company is not liable for an accidental death or injury resulting
from a voluntary act in which the insured did not intend or anticipate a fatal or
injurious result .... The ruling in the California case is well qualified. . . .In the
case before us, there was this element of unexpectedness, that the insured inhaled
more than he expected to inhale. . . .Means or cause of his death was not that
he intentionally inhaled too much chlorophorm ...but that he unintentionally in-
haled too much." Brown v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 La. 230, 238, 108 So.
464, 466 (1926).
15. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F.2d 853
(4th Cir. 1929).
16. Brooks v. Continental Casualty Co., 128 So. 183 (La. App. 1930).
17. The confusion and uncertainty can best be illustrated by quoting from por-
tions of the opinion of the Court of Appeal for Orleans Parish in the case of
Brackman v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 5 So.2d 565 (La. App. 1942),
wherein it was stated by Judge Janvier: "The distinction is a very fine one, and
we are not all certain that we, ourselves, clearly understand it, or that we could,
under any given state of facts, determine with reasonable conviction just whether
it is the means or the result which is accidental. But we are forced to recognize
that there is a distinction because our Supreme Court has said so." Id. at 567.
Again, "we would find it hard to reconcile that result [in the Brown case]
with the one reached in the Parker case, were it not for the fact that the court
itself found no conflict." Id. at 569.
And finally, "we cheerfully, though rather confusedly, accept the doctrine of
the Landress case and the Parker case, that there is a distinction -between acci-
dental means and an accidental result . . . . [T]here is respectable authority for
the view that even the distinction recognized in the Landress and the Parker cases
is a spurious one." Id. at 570.
18. 178 La. 977, 152 So. 583 (1934).
19. The Supreme Court relied in part upon the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491
(1934).
20. Parker v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 178 La. 977, 152 So. 583
(1934).
NOTES
oretical reconciliation with the Brown case was made by the
court in the Parker case by viewing the act of the physician in
the Brown case as intentional to induce relief but unintentional
as to the actual result -death. 21 As pointed out in the dis-
sent,22 and in the instant case,2 this reconciliation was without
merit.
The instant case clearly repudiates the confusing distinction
which had plunged this branch of the law into a "Serbonian
bog."' 24 The court, reiterating the criticisms of the dissenters in
leading cases adhering to the distinction, stated that doubts as
to the validity of the distinction had caused an increasing num-
ber of jurisdictions to construe the terms "accidental means" as
that which in the ordinary language of laymen is considered to be
an accident. 25 The court found this approach in harmony with
the Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting other types of insuring
clauses. 26 Rather than perpetuate the technical distinction of the
Parker case which was so at variance with the usual rules on
interpretation, the present clause was construed by the court in
accordance with the common and usual significance attached by
general and popular use of the language in question.2 7 Thus, re-
covery under the term "accidental means" is no longer precluded
merely because the precipitating act producing the accidental
result is in itself voluntary and intentional. The test in Louisi-
ana now seems to be "whether the average man, under the exist-
ing facts and circumstances, would regard the loss as so unfore-
seen, unexpected, and extraordinary that he would say it was an
accident. '28
The repudiation of the technical distinction is to be lauded for
dissipating the "Serbonian bog" of semantical confusion which
has engulfed this branch of the law. It should be pointed out
that the test adopted by the court lacks precision and certainty.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Gaskins v. New York Life Insurance Co., 104 So.2d 171, 175 (La. 1958).
24. See dissenting opinion of Justice Cardoza in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491-499 (1934), where the eminent jurist stated:
"The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will
plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian bog." From Milton's Paradise Lost,
Book 2, Line 392:
"A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whole have sunk ... "
25. 104 So.2d 171, 176 (La. 1958).





Due to its broadness, it fails to provide certainty in the deter-
mination of whether particular incidents are "accidental." How-
ever, it is submitted that a general test is the only practical one
that could be adopted in view of the variety and complexity of
factual situations which arise in this branch of the law.
Charley Quienalty
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIAN MILITARY DEPENDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Defendant, a civilian, was tried and convicted for the murder
of her Air Force husband by a general court-martial.' The mili-
tary court predicated its jurisdiction upon Article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2 and an executive agreement
between England and the United States. The conviction was af-
firmed by the Air Force Board of Review, but reversed by the
Court of Military Appeals, because of prejudicial errors concern-
ing the defense of insanity. After she was transferred to this
country, and while awaiting a proposed retrial by court-martial,
the defendant petitioned a federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus to release her on the ground that the Constitution
did not permit her trial by military authorities. The district
court granted the writ and ordered her released. The govern-
ment appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed the district court. On rehearing, the decision of
the district court was held, affirmed. Justice Black, in an opinion
in which three Justices joined, held that criminal action by the
United States against a service man's overseas civilian depend-
1. Of course, jury trial is not within the scheme of courts-martial. Instead,
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 16, c. 169, 64 STAT. 113 (1950), 10
U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V, 1958) provides that: "The three kinds of courts-martial
in each of the armed forces are- (1) general courts-martial, consisting of a law
officer and not less than five members; (2) special courts-martial, consisting of
not less than three members; and (3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one
commissioned officer."
2. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(11), c. 169, 64 STAT. 109 (1950),
10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. V, 1958) : "The following persons are subject to this
chapter:
"(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, em-
ployed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States."
3. 57 STAT. 1193, E.A.S. No. 355 (July 27, 1942). The appropriate forum for
trying an accused dependent in England, as well as the other North Atlantic Treaty
Nations, is provided for in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 4 U.S. U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, June 19, 1951 (effective August 23, 1953).
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